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ABSTRACT
A spirited debate explores the comparative merits of two
different approaches to the enforcement of environmental
law: the noncooperative approach, which emphasizes the
deterrence of noncompliance through inflexibly imposed
sanctions, and the cooperative approach, which emphasizes
the inducement of compliance through flexibility and assis-
tance. Both scholarly and policymaking communities are
interested in this topic of enforcement approach within the
realms of finance, tax compliance, occupational safety, food
and drug safety, consumer product safety, and environmen-
tal protection, among others. To inform this debate, our
study explores enforcement of environmental protection laws
where the debate has been especially spirited yet lacking in
much empirical evidence. Specifically, our study empirically
analyzes the effect of enforcement approach on the frequency
of self-audits linked to compliance with wastewater discharge
limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities. For this
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analysis, we view the enforcement approach as representing a
relationship between a regulator and a regulated facility that
is measured in multiple dimensions. The empirical results
reveal that, in general, a cooperative relationship induces
more frequent auditing and, in particular, a more stable and
higher quality relationship increases audit frequency, while
a completely fair relationship yields less frequent auditing.
However, these conclusions may depend on the extent of reg-
ulatory monitoring and enforcement. Specifically, they rely
on sufficiently lower monitoring and enforcement. Once the
extent of monitoring and enforcement becomes sufficiently
strong, the empirical results appear to support the opposite
conclusions.
Keywords: Environmental management; compliance; enforcement ap-
proach; self-audits.
JEL Codes: K32, K42, Q53
Introduction
For years a spirited debate has explored the comparative merits of two
different approaches to the enforcement of regulatory law: the noncoop-
erative approach, which emphasizes the deterrence of non-compliance
through inflexibly imposed sanctions, and the cooperative approach,
which emphasizes the inducement of compliance through flexibility, in-
cluding the provision of compliance assistance that is designed to induce
facilities to address non-compliance pro-actively. (Most other studies
refer to the “noncooperative” approach as the “coercive” approach or
“deterrence-based” approach; in general, we use the term “noncoopera-
tive”.) Both scholarly and policymaking communities are interested in
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this topic of enforcement approach within the regulatory realms that
include finance, tax compliance, occupational safety, food and drug
safety, consumer product safety, and environmental protection (Ayers
and Braithwaite, 1992).
In the realm of environmental protection, a debate over enforcement
is greatly warranted since compliance assurance represents one of the
most contentious issues in the post-2000 EPA policy agenda (EPA, 2000;
Glicksman and Earnhart, 2007). As in other regulatory realms, the
debate focuses on the two identified approaches.
Supporters of the noncooperative model regard the deterrence of
violations as the fundamental purpose of environmental enforcement
(Markel, 2000, 2005; Mintz, 1995). These supporters also regard the
imposition of enforcement sanctions, which make it more costly for reg-
ulated entities to avoid complying with their regulatory responsibilities,
as the most effective way to induce regulated entities to comply with
their regulatory obligations. Supporters of the cooperative approach
to environmental enforcement focus more on compliance than deter-
rence, based on the premise that regulated facilities react to a variety
of motives that supply sufficient incentives to comply with regulatory
obligations even without inflexible imposition of sanctions (Andreen,
2007; Stoughton et al., 2001). In this light, a noncooperative approach
may even be counterproductive if it engenders intransigence and ill will
on the part of regulated facilities.
Since the initial implementation of environmental protection laws in
the United States, environmental enforcement has shifted away from tra-
ditional, deterrence-based enforcement and towards a more partnership-
based, less adversarial approach that uses multiple tools for inducing
compliance (Stoughton et al., 2001). In particular, during the 1990s,
EPA improved cooperation between the agency and regulated facilities
by adopting enforcement policies that were designed to provide a more
flexible approach to inducing compliance with regulatory obligations
by offering “compliance incentives” and “compliance assistance” to regu-
lated facilities (Andreen, 2007). This shift most likely was prompted by
a “broad agreement at the federal and state levels that the traditional,
exclusive reliance on penalty-based enforcement approaches to compli-
ance assurance is inadequate” (Stoughton et al., 2001). Accordingly
to (Stahl, 1995), the EPA concluded that a penalty-based approach
is reactive rather than proactive and is incomplete because it fails to
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reward voluntary compliance. Similarly, many states to some extent
have replaced traditional enforcement with some form of cooperation
(Andreen, 2007). However, no shift from a noncooperative approach
to a cooperative approach has been complete. Despite the dichotomy
between noncooperative and cooperative enforcement approaches, fed-
eral and state agencies rarely rely exclusively on one approach; studies
of agency enforcement reveal that “most enforcers use a flexible, hy-
brid strategy that includes elements of both coercion and cooperation”
(Rechtschaffen, 2004). Certainly, given the broad discretion that envi-
ronmental statutes typically vest in federal and state agencies, these
agencies possess a considerable range of choices when deciding the mix
of noncooperative and cooperative techniques to apply in particular
cases.
For all the debate that the recent emphasis on cooperative enforce-
ment approaches has engendered, relatively little empirical research
has been directed at a comparison of the two enforcement approaches.
Specifically, few studies empirically test these competing theories about
how best to induce environmental compliance or, more fundamentally,
how best to spur regulated facilities to undertake better environmental
management that in turn should lead to environmental compliance.
This study attempts to address the paucity of empirical evidence
by examining the effect of the overall enforcement approach on the
frequency of auditing conducted by chemical manufacturing facilities
regulated under the Clean Water Act. For this empirical examination,
we conducted a survey of all chemical manufacturing facilities regulated
between 1999 and 2001. The survey responses indicate that, although
most regulated facilities describe their relationships with wastewater reg-
ulators as generally either cooperative or noncooperative, these facilities
also report that some particular aspects of their relationships are more
consistent with cooperation, while other aspects are less consistent with
cooperation. This assessment reveals that the relationship between a
regulator and a regulated facility consists of multiple dimensions, which
we claim are reflective of the overall enforcement approach. To be clear,
our survey identifies only one aspect that clearly contrasts a cooperative
approach and a noncooperative approach; for the remaining aspects,
our survey simply identifies the extent of cooperation: more versus less.
Our empirical analysis exploits these multiple dimensions so our
empirical results provide a more accurate portrayal of the effects of the
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overall enforcement approach on auditing frequency. By recognizing the
nuanced nature of the relationships between regulator and regulated
facilities, we are able to provide a more meaningful contribution to
the ongoing debate over the effect of enforcement approach on the
environmental behavior and performance of regulated facilities.
Empirical results indicate that a generally cooperative approach
appears to induce more frequent auditing, while a completely fair
treatment of regulated facilities appears to lower audit frequency. Similar
to the general approach, both the stability and quality of the regulator–
regulated facility relationship appears to increase auditing frequency.
In general, our conclusions are moderately robust to the type of facility:
major versus minor. However, these conclusions appear to depend on the
extent of regulatory monitoring and enforcement since the underlying
marginal effects depend on these regulatory conditions. Specifically, the
conclusions and their underlying marginal effects rely on sufficiently
lower monitoring and enforcement. Once the extent of monitoring and
enforcement becomes sufficiently strong, the generated marginal effects
appear to support the opposite conclusions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section
summarizes the previous theoretical and empirical literature. The
third section presents the selection of the research sample, while briefly
describing wastewater regulatory efforts. The fourth section constructs
the econometric model. The fifth section describes the data. The sixth
section presents the estimation results. The seventh section discusses
the policy and research implications.
Literature Review
This section reviews the previous literature on the theoretical frameworks
underlying the noncooperative and cooperative enforcement approaches
and the few empirical studies that directly compare the two approaches
in the environmental realm.
Noncooperative and Cooperative Approaches
to Enforcement: Theory
A review of the legal, political science, and economics literature on
environmental enforcement reveals a debate about the comparative
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efficacy of two different models of environmental enforcement: the
noncooperative model and the cooperative model.
Noncooperative Approach to Environmental
Enforcement and Compliance: Theory
The noncooperative model is premised on the idea that regulated facili-
ties are rational economic actors whose principal motivations revolve
around the maximization of expected benefits net of costs (Malloy, 2003;
Spence, 2001). The noncooperative model postulates that decisions
regarding compliance are based on self-interest; businesses comply when
the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance
(Vandenbergh, 2003). The benefits are avoided by compliance costs.
The costs of noncompliance include any additional costs of achieving
compliance once a violation is detected as compared to achieving compli-
ance earlier, plus any applicable penalties. These costs can also include
damage to the business’s reputation, potential tort liability, and legal
system expenses (Karpoff et al., 2005; Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003;
Vandenbergh, 2003).
The noncooperative model also proceeds on the premise that in-
creasing the certainty and severity of penalties deters noncompliance
(Becker, 1968). A facility’s compliance status depends on the likelihood
that violations will be detected and on the severity of imposed sanc-
tions (Kagan et al., 2005). Thus, the essential task for enforcement
agencies is to make penalties high enough and the probability of detec-
tion/enforcement great enough that it becomes economically irrational
for regulated facilities to violate the law (Cohen, 2000).
In sum, the noncooperative model emphasizes the importance of
policing and deterring violations as the essential core of environmental
agencies’ activities. Consistent with this emphasis, the EPA traditionally
sought to impose sanctions that exceed the economic benefit the violators
gained from noncompliance (Markel, 2005).
Cooperative Approach to Environmental Enforcement
and Compliance: Theory
The cooperative model is premised on the assumption that corporations
represent institutions that are influenced by a mix of civic and societal
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motives, not just maximization of profits. This model postulates that
corporations are generally inclined to comply with the law (Rechtschaffen
and Markell, 2003). Correspondingly, the cooperative model emphasizes
compliance rather than the deterrence of noncompliance.
This emphasis alters the use of both inspections and enforcement.
Within the cooperative model, an inspection is designed to facilitate
compliance by providing advice to regulated facilities (Rechtschaffen
and Markell, 2003). In contrast, within the noncooperative model, an
inspection is primarily conducted in an effort to detect violations and
collect evidence for subsequent enforcement actions. Under both models,
facility inspections serve as threats of future enforcement action.
The cooperative model’s emphasis on compliance also alters the
use of enforcement actions. Under this model, regulated facilities may
be afforded more opportunities to avoid sanctions by resolving non-
compliance before a penalty is assessed or other enforcement action
pursued than under the noncooperative model. As a result, the co-
operative approach “emphasizes flexible or selective enforcement that
takes into consideration the particular circumstances of an observed
violation” (Scholz, 1984). Indeed, imposing penalties is viewed as a sign
of the cooperative system’s failure to obtain compliance (Rechtschaffen,
1998).
As an important extension of this logic, if businesses are generally
committed to compliance even without a coercive enforcement presence,
sanctions may not only be unnecessary but also be counter-productive.
A sanction-oriented response to noncompliance may make regulated
facilities resentful and less likely to cooperate with regulators in the
future (Burby and Paterson, 1993; Kagan et al., 2005). In many
contexts, random variations in facility operations or unexpected events
may occasionally push a facility into noncompliance. A coercive response
to these noncompliance events may breed especially strong resentment
or ill will.
In essence, the cooperative model relies on flexible guidelines rather
than uniform rules, an emphasis on ex ante prevention of violations
rather than ex post sanctions for noncompliance, and compliance assis-
tance from regulators (Burby, 1995). This model rests on the premise
that regulated facilities should respond more positively to regulators’
suggestions on how to achieve compliance than to the threat of coercive
sanctions (Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003).
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Noncooperative versus Cooperative Enforcement: Empirical Studies
Relatively few empirical studies analyze the use of cooperative enforce-
ment strategies. Harrison (1995) states that past studies hailing the
merits of cooperative enforcement lack empirical support. There is
even less research directly comparing noncooperative and cooperative
strategies. According to Rechtschaffen (1998), “[t]he argument that
cooperation works better than deterrence to achieve compliance with
environmental law ... is largely untested.” Most evidence is anecdotal.
Some studies do analyze the efficacy of overall enforcement strategies
First, Harrison (1995) analyzes the regulation of water pollution in
Canada. She finds that rates of compliance with water pollution controls
are significantly lower in the pulp and paper industry in Canada, where
the cooperative approach to enforcement is generally followed, than
in the United States. She concludes that the cooperative Canadian
approach has delivered disappointing results compared to the U.S.’s
relatively more adversarial approach. Second, Burby (1995) examines
states’ programs to reduce erosion and sedimentation pollution in urban
areas. He concludes that “[t]he best performing state programs [for
nonpoint sources of water pollution] tend to be those that use a highly
coercive approach.” Third, Burby and Paterson (1993) examine whether
the cooperative approach is better suited to inducing compliance with
performance standards than with specification (or design) standards.
Their results show that “a cooperative approach to enforcement has
much more impact on the degree of compliance attained for performance
standards than for specification standards.” Fourth, Andreen (2007)
examines compliance rates for major dischargers under the CWA. He
finds that compliance rates remained static during the period in which
many states were replacing traditional enforcement with some type of
cooperative enforcement. He concludes that “[t]he new, more flexible
approach has not improved rates of compliance.”
While these empirical studies help to inform our understanding
of enforcement strategies and their relative efficacy, only one study
(Burby, 1995) gathers facility-specific data on the type of relationship
between regulators and regulated facilities and no study considers this
relationship as consisting of multiple dimensions. In contrast, the
present study examines both of these aspects. In particular, the present
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study distinguishes between the relative presence of one enforcement
approach versus the other approach by assessing multiple dimensions.1
Empirical Application
Selection of Research Sample
To examine the effect of enforcement strategies, this study examines a
specific element relating to compliance with environmental protection
regulations: the frequency of wastewater-related self-audits implemented
by U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities whose wastewater discharges
were regulated by effluent limits imposed within the Clean Water Act’s
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
program between 1999 and 2001. By focusing on regulated facilities,
our analysis is able to focus on environmental audits that include an
assessment of compliance with the noted NPDES effluent limits. Unlike
several previous studies of environmental behavior, our study considers
facilities of all sizes, especially both “minor” and “major” facilities as
classified by the NPDES system.
We choose the industrial sector of chemical and allied products as the
focus of our study because it serves as an excellent vehicle for examining
the efficacy of enforcement strategies on regulated facilities’ auditing
practices First, The EPA has demonstrated a strong interest in this
sector as evidenced by its study (joint with the Chemical Manufacturing
Association [CMA], which later became the American Chemistry Council
[ACC]) on the root causes of noncompliance in this sector (EPA, 1999)
and its study of the compliance history for this sector [Chemical Industry
National Environmental Baseline Report 1990–1994 (EPA 305-R-96-
002)]. Consistent with this interest, two of the chemical industrial
sub-sectors, industrial organics and chemical preparations (SIC-codes
2869 and 2899), were regarded by the EPA as priority industrial sectors
during a portion of the study period. Second, This sector is expected
to display a wide scope in the facilities’ extent of auditing practices.
Consistent with this expectation, a substantial portion of the sampled
1Notable studies explore specific cooperative approaches within a standard
noncooperative arrangement (Helland, 1998; Short and Toffel, 2010; Stretesky and
Gabriel, 2005; Toffel and Short, 2011).
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facilities never audit over the three-year sample period, while several
facilities audit their operations at least monthly. Third, This sector
permits the analysis to exploit similarities and differences across sub-
sectors. Fourth, This sector is responsible for a significant portion of
the nation’s industrial output and a significant portion of all wastewater
discharges by facilities subject to CWA regulation.2
Facilities may control their wastewater discharges in various ways.
In general, facilities use end-of-pipe treatment technologies or proactive
environmental management practices, which collectively may constitute
an environmental management system (EMS). In general, an EMS
represents a set of management rules and procedures designed to reduce
a facility’s environmental impacts and involves components, such as
audit programs and environmental training (Barla, 2007).
Examination of proactive environmental management practices is
certainly relevant to policy development and trends in business man-
agement. Both the EPA and state environmental protection agencies
have created programs to encourage the adoption of environmental
management systems. These programs offer technical assistance, recog-
nition, and regulatory benefits to facilities that employ an environmental
management system (Crow, 2000). Similarly,“business-led” initiatives
have promoted participation in trade association programs emphasiz-
ing environmental management codes, such as the Responsible Care
program of the American Chemistry Council, or the adoption of inter-
national certification standards for environmental management, such as
the International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001 program.
Some empirical studies focus on the presence or absence of an EMS
(e.g., Arimura et al., 2008; Barla, 2007). However, some of the EMS
components may not represent activities that effectively lead to improved
environmental performance (Barla, 2007). Rather than examining the
mere presence of a broad set of management activities or analyzing
a count of practices, this study focuses on the use of a particularly
tangible management activity — environmental regulatory compliance
2The chemical industry is not necessarily representative of all industrial sectors.
Indeed, its unique attributes contribute to our interest in studying it. For example,
some firms in the chemical industry have demonstrated an interest in promoting
pollution reduction and prevention through efforts prompted by the Responsible
Care program, which is a voluntary initiative supported by the American Chemistry
Council. Thus, our results need not generalize to other industries regulated under
the Clean Water Act.
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auditing — that is strongly expected to improve performance. Previous
empirical studies support this expectation (Khanna and Widyawati,
2011; Short and Toffel, 2010; Toffel and Short, 2011); in particular,
(Earnhart, 2004a,b) reveal that more audits lead to better compliance
with wastewater discharge limits. As important, beginning in the
mid-1980s, the EPA has promoted self-audits as a tool for improving
environmental performance, especially for increasing environmental
compliance (Evans et al., 2011). As evidence of this promotion, the
EPA has integrated environmental auditing into its compliance and
enforcement strategy; specifically, the EPA began in 1997 to include
increased environmental auditing in its strategic plan for improving
compliance with environmental regulations (EPA, 1997; Evans et al.,
2011).
A compliance audit represents a systematic, documented, and ob-
jective review of a facility’s operations, which allows the facility to
evaluate its compliance relative to audit criteria (American Society
for Testing and Materials [ASTM], 2003). The EPA defines an envi-
ronmental audit as “a systematic, documented, periodic and objective
review by regulated facilities of facility operations and practices related
to meeting environmental requirements.”3 Rather than examining the
mere presence or absence of an audit program, this study focuses on the
frequency of audits for three reasons First, Most guidelines recommend
that environmental self-audits be conducted at least annually (Ebihara
and Irminger, 2005). Thus, many facilities may conduct at least one
audit per year. Second, Regularly scheduled self-audits contribute to
both stronger overall environmental management and to more consistent
compliance with relevant regulations (Wilson and Thomas, 1998). Thus,
greater frequency should lead to better environmental management.
Third, We wish to examine the extent of environmental management
adoption in a new way.
Unlike other studies that examine the extent of adoption by summing
across dichotomous decisions (e.g., Anton et al., 2004; Khanna and
Anton, 2002),4 our study examines the extent of adoption by measuring
the frequency with which facilities audit their operations.
3“Interim Guidelines on Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,” 50 FR 46504
(November 8, 1985), Section II.A.
4Other studies examine multiple measures of environmental management but
do not exploit the presence of multiple measures in order to calculate the extent of
adoption, (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2000; Arimura et al., 2008).
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In addition, an empirical focus on audits arguably dominates an
empirical focus on the presence of EMS certification, e.g., ISO 14001.
The presence of a certified EMS may reflect decisions made several
years in the past since once certification is obtained it is generally
maintained over time. In contrast, audit frequency reflects ongoing
management decisions.5 Thus, we are better able to understand the
timing of management decisions.
Water Pollution Control and Enforcement
The chosen sample and focus on audit frequency facilitates an effective
analysis of chemical manufacturing facilities’ responses to regulatory
efforts to control wastewater-related pollution. These efforts begin with
the issuance of facility-specific permits, which impose effluent limits that
represent performance-based standards. To ensure compliance with the
permitted effluent limits, the EPA and state agencies periodically inspect
facilities and take enforcement actions as needed. In general, inspections
represent the backbone of environmental agencies’ efforts to monitor
compliance and collect evidence for enforcement. As for enforcement,
agencies use a mixture of informal enforcement actions (e.g., warning
letters) and formal enforcement actions (e.g., administrative orders,
fines). Our analysis considers all types of enforcement actions.
Econometric Approach
To assess the effect of the overall enforcement approach, this section
structures the econometric analysis that estimates the functional rela-
tionship between audit frequency and multiple measures of the overall
enforcement approach employed against the sampled facilities.
Effect of Regulator-Regulated Facility Relationship
In each relevant year of the sample, a facility must choose its envi-
ronmental management level, represented by the count of self-audits,
5These advantages notwithstanding, we acknowledge that the quality of a given
environmental audit may vary across facilities and across time for a particular facility.
We argue that this possible variation in quality is dominated by the variation in
quantity examined here.
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which depends on several factors, especially the overall enforcement
approach.
Given the strongly empirical thrust of this study, we do not attempt
to model formally the relationship between audit frequency and overall
enforcement approach. Instead, we rely upon our review of theoretical
studies (provided in Subsection 2.1.1) for generating the basic hypothe-
ses — (1) more cooperation is better and (2) less cooperation is better —
and by extension the hypotheses associated with individual dimensions
of the overall enforcement approach.
To test these hypotheses, we assess the effects of multiple dimensions
that we claim are reflective of an overall enforcement approach on audit
frequency. For each dimension, we identify a pair of hypotheses. The
first dimension captures the general relationship between the regulator
and the regulated facility: (1) generally cooperative or (2) generally
coercive. Clearly the particular hypotheses are identical to the two
basic hypotheses.
The second dimension captures the prevalence of fair treatment of
the facility by the regulator: (1) always fair, (2) sometimes fair, or
(3) always unfair. Environmental regulation is commonly perceived by
regulated facilities as “unfair”; by extension, inflexible enforcement of
this regulation might also be perceived as “unfair” (Zinn, 2002). More
directly, an excessively stringent approach may be counterproductive
by engendering perceptions that enforcement is “unfair” (Faure, 2012;
Hawkins, 1984). In contrast, a cooperative enforcement approach, which
is flexibly implemented, should mitigate the perceived unfairness of
regulation and enforcement directly. Thus, regulated facilities could
view cooperative enforcement as “fair.” Under the co-operative model,
greater fairness engenders good will, which induces more frequent au-
diting. Under the noncooperative model, greater fairness might dull the
incentive to comply, leading to less frequent auditing.
The third dimension captures the stability of the relationship as
reflected in the assignment of regulatory agency officials: the facility
typically works (1) with the same water regulatory official or (2) with
multiple regulatory officials that vary with circumstances.6 We posit
6The presence of multiple regulators does not reflect additional regulatory at-
tention due to poor management or weak compliance; instead, this presence reflects
the specialization of regulatory oversight in certain cases, e.g., certain regulatory
personnel understand particular treatment technologies better.
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that regulated facilities typically find it easier to maintain a cooperative
relationship with a single regulator than with multiple regulators whose
approaches to compliance may differ and who may not understand the
facility’s operation in its entirety. By working with a single regulator,
presumably a facility enjoys better contact and coordination with the
regulatory agency, along with more instruction offered by the regulator.
Given greater stability leading to more cooperation, under the coopera-
tive model, greater stability prompts more frequent auditing. Under
the noncooperative model, greater stability may not substantially affect
audit frequency.
The fourth and fifth dimensions capture the quality of the working
relationship as reflected in a facility’s decision to seek assistance from
the regulator’s supervisor or an elected official to help with a difference
of opinion between the facility and the regulator. The lack of a request
reflects less friction and more goodwill between the regulator and facility,
that is, more cooperation, than the existence of a request. Thus, under
the cooperative model, the request for assistance indicates friction, which
is expected to lower audit frequency, while under the noncooperative
model, the request for assistance indicates less cooperation, which is
expected to induce more frequent auditing.
The sixth dimension captures the physical proximity of the regulator
involved in the relationship as reflected in the type of regulatory agency
engaging the facility: (1) regional EPA agency or (2) state agency. We
conjecture that regulated facilities may tend to work more cooperatively
with state regulators than with federal regulators because state reg-
ulators tend to work physically closer to regulated facilities. Under
the cooperative model, closer proximity spurs more frequent auditing.
Under the noncooperative model, closer proximity does not influence
auditing.
The last dimension captures the level of trust supported by the rela-
tionship as reflected in a facility’s willingness to allow regulators access
to plant operations if the regulators arrive unannounced. The more
likely a facility is to allow unannounced access, the more cooperative
we regard the relationship. Thus, under the cooperative model, greater
trust induces more frequent auditing, while under the noncooperative
model, greater trust induces less frequent auditing.
By incorporating all seven enforcement strategy dimensions into the
estimated functional relationship, our analysis allows each dimension to
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influence audit frequency independently. This estimation permits the
direction of influence and degree of importance to differ across dimen-
sions. Based on the estimation results, we test each of the identified
hypotheses.
Effects of Other Factors on Audit Frequency
To isolate the effect of the overall enforcement approach on audit
frequency, the analysis controls for the influence of particular government
intervention — inspections and enforcement actions — in two dimensions.
The first dimension considers the ex ante general “threat” of receiving
an intervention in the future based on the experiences of a large number
of facilities, while the second dimension considers adjustments to this
general threat based on the specific government interventions taken
against particular facilities in the recent past (Cohen, 2000).
To calculate the ex ante general threat of a government intervention,
each facility gauges its expectation of monitoring and enforcement based
on the observed experience of other similar facilities, that is, each facility
uses others’ experiences to form its own beliefs (Sah, 1991). This need to
form expectations about interventions stems from the uncertain nature
of inspections and sanctions. When capturing the threat of enforcement
actions, the analysis examines the count of actions taken against all
other “similar” facilities: other regulated chemical facilities in the same
EPA region and year, while distinguishing between major and minor
facilities (i.e., a major facility bases its expectations on the experiences
of other major facilities; similarly for minor facilities). The analysis
then divides each aggregate count of enforcement actions by the number
of other major or minor chemical facilities operating in each EPA region
of the given year. To capture the threat (or likelihood) of an inspection,
the analysis employs two proxies based on the annual aggregate count
of inspections against other chemical facilities in the same location
and year, as with enforcement actions. One proxy captures the state
inspection likelihood, based on facilities in the same state, and the
other proxy captures the federal inspection likelihood, based on facilities
in the same EPA region. Then the analysis divides each aggregate
inspection count by the number of other major or minor chemical
facilities operating in each state or EPA region (as relevant) of the given
year.
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Facilities may make adjustments to these general threats based
on recent interventions taken at specific facilities (Magat and Viscusi,
1990). In essence, these experiences prompt facilities to update their
expectations of the intervention threats. Facilities most likely need at
least a few weeks, if not several months, to respond to interventions.
Even though the study measures the exact date of an intervention,
audits are recorded only on an annual basis. In order to lag properly
the interventions when constructing the relevant regressors, the analysis
considers interventions from the preceding calendar year. (Without this
type of separation, some of the audits may actually precede some of the
interventions in a given year.) The analysis generates separately the
cumulative count of enforcement actions, state inspections, and federal
inspections taken against a specific facility in the preceding calendar
year.
The effects of government interventions targeted against particular
facilities may more closely align with the effect of the regulator–regulated
facility relationship. Thus, our study should focus more attention on
specific adjustment and less attention on the general threat. Conse-
quently, our study analyzes first only the effect of specific adjustment
and then analyzes both the effects of specific adjustment and general
threat.
The expected effects of government interventions on audit frequency
depend on the theoretical model. Under the noncooperative model,
both state and federal inspections should induce more frequent audits.
However, under the cooperative model, state inspections should induce
more frequent audits, while federal inspections may induce less fre-
quent audits if the presence of federal inspectors is perceived as “heavy
handed.”7 The expected effects of enforcement are similar to those of
federal inspections under the two models.
Other regulatory factors may also affect audit frequency. The
analysis attempts to control for variation in regulatory pressure not
reflected in the aforementioned measures by including EPA regional
indicators as regressors. Inclusion of these regional indicators is a
7We acknowledge that the distinction between state and federal inspections is
weaker in our analysis since we control for the overall enforcement approach. Other
studies examine more closely this distinction between state and federal inspections
(Earnhart, 2004b, 2009).
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blunt tool for controlling “un-measured” variation in monitoring and
enforcement across space. This inclusion forces the analysis to identify
the effect of the overall enforcement approach based exclusively on intra-
regional variation, which may be insufficient for the task. Consequently,
we reserve the inclusion of regional indicators as only a means for
assessing the robustness of the empirical results.
Audit frequency also depends on facility- and firm-level characteris-
tics First, Industrial sub-sector indicators help to control for variation
in facilities’ abilities to monitor their operations, including their produc-
tion processes, based on the type of product being manufactured. The
analysis includes two sub-sectoral indicators: organic chemical indicator
and inorganic chemical indicator, with “other chemicals” as the omit-
ted category. Second, Audit frequency may depend on the size of the
regulated facility. The analysis measures facility size using two proxies.
The number of employees represents the more common proxy of facility
size. The NPDES facility classification represents the less common
proxy but potentially the more relevant proxy for understanding the
influence of facility size on audit frequency. The analysis includes a
“major facility” indicator, with “minor facility” as the omitted category.
By assessing the influence of these two facility size proxies, the analysis
may be able to discern the presence of any economies or diseconomies
of scale with respect to audit frequency. Third, Audit frequency may
depend on the facility’s age. Older facilities may be less likely to audit
their operations or may audit their operations less frequently because
facilities built years ago were not designed to facilitate easy monitoring.
Alternatively, newer facilities may audit less frequently because their
operations involve fewer problems that stem from wear and tear (e.g.,
leaks). Fourth, Audit frequency may depend on the facility’s years of
experience in the NPDES regulatory system. Over time, facilities may
gain a better understanding of the regulatory system, thus, reducing
the benefits of a proactive approach, i.e., experience substitutes for the
insight gleaned from audits. Fifth, Firm ownership structure, as repre-
sented by the distinction between publicly held firms and privately held
firms, reflects a host of dimensions. For example, publicly held firms
stand to lose more from negative news regarding their environmental
management, prompting facilities owned by publicly held firms to audit
more frequently. The analysis includes a “publicly held” indicator, with
“privately held” as the omitted category.
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Data Collection
Data Sources
In order to examine the effect of overall enforcement approach on the
audit decisions of chemical manufacturing facilities, this study gathers
information from various data sources. Most important, we implemented
a survey of regulated chemical facilities, which gathered data on the
nature of facilities’ relationships and interactions with wastewater regu-
lators, environmental management practices, especially wastewater self-
audits, and facility characteristics (e.g., age). We also gathered publicly
available data. We gathered information on firm ownership structure
from the EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database, Business and
Company Resource Center database, and Compustat/Research Insight
database. We also collected data from the EPA Permit Compliance
System (PCS) database, which records information on NPDES facilities,
on each facility’s (1) location, (2) major or minor classification, and (3)
four-digit standard industrial classification [SIC] code.8 From the PCS
database, we also gathered data on state and federal inspections. And
we gathered complementary data on enforcement actions from the PCS
database and the EPA Docket database.
Survey of Regulated Chemical Manufacturing Facilities:
Implementation
To implement our survey of chemical manufacturing facilities, we first
identified the proper population of facilities to survey. The population
is based on a full extract drawn from the EPA’s PCS database as of
September, 2001. In order to screen for currently regulated facilities,
we applied the following criteria to facilities: (1) possessed an NPDES
permit; (2) faced restrictions on their wastewater discharges, (3) were
operating as of 2002, and (4) discharged pollutants into surface water
bodies.9 Application of these criteria identified 1003 facilities to contact.
8The analysis aggregates the four-digit SIC codes into three broader sectoral
categories: organic chemicals, inorganic chemicals, and “other” chemicals. The broad
category of organic chemicals includes the following four-digit SIC codes: 2821, 2823,
2824, 2843, 2865, 2869, 2891, and 2899. The broad category of inorganic chemicals
includes the following four-digit SIC codes: 2812, 2813, 2816, 2819, 2873, and 2874.
9We focus on facilities discharging into surface water bodies because facilities dis-
charging into publicly owned treatment works face a distinctively different regulatory
regime.
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Of those facilities contacted between April 2002 and March 2003, 736
refused to participate in the survey, while 267 facilities completed at least
90% of the survey, implying a 27% response rate. This rate is comparable
to previous large-scale surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura et al.,
2011, 2008; Nakamura et al., 2001) and lies above the average response
rate of 21% as identified by a review of 183 studies based on business
surveys published in academic journals (Paxson, 1992). [An online
appendix addresses the possible concern of sample selection bias.]
Summary of Data
This subsection summarizes the collected data, with a focus on the
survey-derived data. Table 1a tabulates the distribution of self-audits
Table 1a: Statistical summary: Distribution of audit counts.
Audit count N Pct Cumulative N Cumulative Pct
0 85 13.89 85 13.89
1 241 39.38 326 53.27
2 70 11.44 396 64.71
3 18 2.94 414 67.65
4 67 10.95 481 78.59
5 12 1.96 493 80.56
6 6 0.98 499 81.54
8 3 0.49 502 82.03
10 1 0.16 503 82.19
12 64 10.46 567 92.65
13 1 0.16 568 92.81
17 2 0.33 570 93.14
20 2 0.33 572 93.46
24 7 1.14 579 94.61
27 1 0.16 580 94.77
36 3 0.49 583 95.26
40 4 0.65 587 95.92
45 4 0.65 591 96.57
50 4 0.65 595 97.22
52 17 2.78 612 100.00
Note: Based on sample used for estimation of year-specific equations.
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performed over a given calendar year by a particular facility. The
tabulation reveals that nearly 86% of the sample facilities perform
at least one audit per year; thus, only 14% of the facilities lack an
audit program. As expected, the distinction between no audits and
some audits does not divide the sample strongly. The median facility
performs a single audit per year. One to three audits per year are
conducted by a majority of the facilities (54%). Wastewater compliance
is typically assessed monthly via submission of a monthly discharge
monitoring report (DMR) to a regulatory authority; a good portion of
facilities (10%) perform audits at a frequency identical to this compliance
reporting activity.10
Table 1c summarizes the dimensions reflecting a facility’s relationship
with its regulatory authority. Only 3% of facilities state that their
relationship is “generally coercive,” while 97% state that it is “generally
cooperative.” Moreover, 19% of facilities report that treatment by its
regulator is “sometimes fair, sometimes unfair,” while 81% report that
it is “always fair,” yet no facility reports that its treatment is “always
unfair.” Table 1c also indicates that 58% of facilities typically work with
the same regulator, while 42% typically work with multiple regulators.
Additionally, 79% of facilities did not seek help from the supervisor
of the regulator, while 21% did so. Similarly, 95% of facilities did
not request assistance from an elected official, while 5% did make a
request. In addition, 99% of facilities report that they typically work
with state regulators, while only 1% report that they typically work with
federal regulators.11 Lastly, 90% of facilities are “always likely” to allow
regulators access to plant operations if regulators arrive unannounced,
10Seven percent of the sample facilities perform more than 12 audits per year
(i.e., more frequently than monthly audits). The presence of these relatively high
audit frequencies may raise concerns. Fortunately, the presence of these higher audit
frequencies does not drive the results. Estimation of a subsample that excludes all
observations with a greater than monthly audit frequency generates results highly
similar to those reported. Moreover, the distribution of these higher audit frequencies
reveals a systematic pattern of audits. A strong majority of these observations lie at
identifiable frequencies: semi-monthly audits (count = 24) and weekly audits (count
= 52).
11The predominance of state regulators reflects the fact that EPA has delegated
NPDES permitting authority to state environmental agencies in most states. As of
2006, only five states had not received authority to administer at least some aspect
of the NPDES permit program.
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Table 1b: Statistical summary: Correlations between measures of regulator-regulated
facility relationship.
Measure of relationship [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[1] Allowing regulator
access to plant without
announcement: always
likely versus not
[2] Typical type of 0.089
regulator: state versus (0.162)
federal
[3] Stability of interaction: 0.021 0.106
Same individual versus
multiple individuals
(0.745) (0.096)
[4] Treatment of regulated −0.055 0.070 0.224
facility by regulator:
always fair treatment
versus not always fair
(0.382) (0.267) (0.000)
[5] Overall relationship: −0.054 −0.015 0.099 0.345
cooperative versus coercive (0.388) (0.811) (0.115) (0.000)
[6] Requested assistance 0.015 −0.054 0.059 0.222 0.222
from regulator’s supervisor:
no versus yes
(0.808) (0.394) (0.350) (0.000) (0.000)
[7] Requested assistance 0.055 −0.024 0.033 0.080 0.076 0.221
from elected official: no
versus yes
(0.383) (0.709) (0.602) (0.205) (0.227) (0.000)
Note: Based on a single year’s subsample; p-values shown in parentheses.
while 9% are either “likely” or “somewhat likely” to allow access, yet no
facility is “not at all likely” to allow access.12
Next, the analysis compares the responses to the individual relation-
ship-related questions by calculating Pearson pairwise correlation
coefficients between all possible pairs of relationship elements; these cor-
relations are reported in Table 1b. In general, these statistics reveal only
12As complementary analysis, we assess the distribution of each overall enforcement
approach dimension for each state separately. As noted, the state regulator serves
as the primary regulator for nearly all of the sampled facilities. Accordingly, we
exclude the few facilities for whom an EPA regional office serves as their regulator.
Our assessment reveals that, in nearly all of the states and for all of the enforcement
approach dimensions, state regulators employ a similar overall enforcement approach
against most but not all facilities. Thus, variation exists even at the state level in
general. Details are available upon request.
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weak correlation between the various measures capturing the relation-
ship between the regulator and the regulated facility. Of the 21 pairwise
correlations, only 6 are positive and statistically significantly different
from zero (i.e., p ≤ 0.10). Of these significantly positive correlations, the
largest magnitude is only 0.35, indicating limited connection between
these pairs of responses. As important, 5 of the correlations are actually
negative though the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero.
The remaining 10 correlations are positive but insignificantly different
from zero. This analysis demonstrates that the relationship between
a regulator and a regulated facility consists of multiple dimensions. In
other words, no single underlying dimension seems to reflect all of the
responses.13
Given the survey question structure and the response patterns, only
one dimension demands manipulation to create a dichotomous indicator.
If a facility is “always likely” to allow a regulator access to the facility’s
operations, the relationship is deemed “more cooperative.” If a facility
is only “likely” or “somewhat likely” to allow access, the relationship is
deemed “less cooperative.”
Similar to many studies of environmental management that rely on
surveys, not all of our sampled facilities provide complete information
on the dependent and independent variables. Of the 267 facilities who
completed most of the survey, 215 provide complete information.
Table 1c summarizes the dependent variable and the remaining
regressors.
13We also assess Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the seven overall
enforcement approach elements and the three specific government intervention factors.
For the correlations relating to state inspections, only 2 of 7 correlations prove
statistically significant at the 10% level or better (both correlations are positive)
and all of the correlation magnitudes range merely between −0.05 and 0.12. For the
correlations relating to federal inspections, none prove statistically significant and
the magnitudes range merely between −0.02 and 0.06. For the correlations relating
to environmental actions, none prove statistically significant and the magnitudes
range merely between −0.07 and 0.05. Thus, none of these results indicates any
concern about collinearity between overall enforcement approach and government
interventions.
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Table 1c: Statistical summary: Means and standard deviations of regression variables.
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variable
Audit Count 5.580 10.959
Regulator–regulated facility relationship dimensions
Generally cooperative (vs generally coercive) 0.967 0.178
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes fair treatment) 0.810 0.392
Same individual regulator (vs multiple regulators) 0.582 0.494
No request for assistance from regulator’s supervisor (vs request) 0.791 0.407
No request for assistance from elected official (vs request) 0.946 0.226
State is typical regulator (vs federal) 0.994 0.040
Always likely to allow unannounced access (vs likely/somewhat
likely)
0.895 0.306
Other Regressors
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs “other chemicals”) 0.443 0.497
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs “other chemicals”) 0.301 0.459
Major facility classification (vs minor facility) 0.420 0.494
Facility employees (count) 268.558 491.257
Age of facility (years) 43.433 24.022
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) 18.727 8.387
Facility owned by publicly held firm (vs privately held firm) 0.641 0.480
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.784 1.499
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) 0.042 0.246
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) 0.178 1.344
Annual state inspections of others/No. of other facilities
(count/facility)
0.808 1.056
Annual federal inspections of others/No. of other facilities
(count/facility)
0.035 0.056
Annual enforcement actions at others/No. of other facilities
(count/facility)
0.115 0.312
EPA Region 1 (1,0)a 0.034 0.182
EPA Region 2 (1,0)a 0.085 0.279
EPA Region 3 (1,0)a 0.142 0.349
EPA Region 4 (1,0)a 0.263 0.441
EPA Region 5 (1,0)a 0.160 0.367
EPA Region 6 (1,0)a 0.204 0.403
EPA Region 7 (1,0)a 0.070 0.256
Note: aOmitted category = EPA Regions 8 and 9.
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Estimation Methods and Results
Estimation Methods
This sub-section describes the estimation methods employed to examine
the link from enforcement approach to audit frequency while addressing
important econometric considerations.
As one important econometric consideration, our primary explana-
tory variables — measures of the enforcement approach — may be
endogenous regressors. The validity of this concern over endogeneity
varies across the measures of the enforcement approach. On one end
of the spectrum, certain measures clearly represent decisions made by
the regulator or facility, e.g., facilities’ decisions to request assistance
from a regulator’s supervisor or elected official. On the other end of
the spectrum, certain measures are most likely exogenously determined.
For example, the primary type of regulator — state versus federal —
depends on whether a state agency has primacy over the NPDES pro-
gram, which is not specific to a particular facility. To a lesser extent,
interaction with the same individual regulatory official rather than
multiple regulatory officials may simply reflect personnel decisions made
independent of a particular facility.
We assess this endogeneity concern by implementing tests of exo-
geneity. Testing the exogeneity of seven regressors is beyond the means
of standard statistical tools. For example, in their highly cited research,
Stock and Yogo (2005) consider a maximum of three endogenous re-
gressors when tabulating critical values for assessing the relevance of
instruments used within an instrumental variables estimator. Rather
than tackling all seven dimensions of the enforcement approach as
separate regressors, we collapse these dimensions into a single index
by summing the indicators of more cooperation (as opposed to less
cooperation) across the enforcement approach dimensions. This index
distinguishes enforcement strategies along a spectrum of cooperation.
The lowest point of this index (=0) reflects a weakly cooperative strategy,
while the highest point on this index (=7) reflects a strongly cooperative
strategy.
We test the exogeneity of this cooperation index. To implement the
exogeneity tests, we use three instruments that are expected to affect
the enforcement approach but not independently affect facilities’ audit
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decisions: (1) time since the state agency gained primacy to implement
the NPDES program, (2) two-year lagged state inspections, and (3)
two-year lagged federal inspections.14 Based on both partial F -test and
minimum Eigenvalue statistics, these instruments appear relevant, that
is, they help to explain the magnitude of the enforcement approach
index. Based on both Sargan and Basman test of Overidentifying
Restrictions statistics, the instruments do not appear invalid, i.e., they
do not affect audit frequency. Most important, both Wu–Hausman and
Durban test of Exogeneity statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis
of exogeneity. All of these conclusions are fully robust to the time
period analyzed and the regressor set used for estimation.15 Moreover,
these conclusions are fully robust to the use of a single instrument —
time since gaining primacy, which represents the strongest instrument
from a theoretical perspective. Specifically, after controlling for various
government interventions and the overall enforcement approach, state
primacy should not directly affect facilities’ audit decisions, that is, the
effect of state primacy should be only indirect. Given these conclusions,
we do not employ an instrumental variables estimator since the benefits
appear outweighed by the costs of reduced efficiency in the estimates,
that is, performing instrumental variables estimation when the regressors
are uncorrelated with the error process involves an important cost —
“the asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is always larger, and
sometimes much larger” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 490).
As another important econometric consideration, the measure of
environmental management is audit frequency; thus, the dependent
variable represents a non-negative sum of discrete events, that is, count
data. Accordingly, this study employs a standard count data estimator,
the Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), while invoking robust
standard errors.
The collected data measure audit frequency over multiple years
(1999, 2000, 2001) for each sampled facility. To accommodate the panel
structure of these data, the analysis employs two estimation approaches.
14Anton et al. (2004) use additionally lagged measures of inspections in order to
test the exogeneity of environmental management when environmental performance
is the dependent variable.
15Depending on the time period and regressor set, the partial F -test p-values lie
between 0.0001 and 0.0069, the overidentifying restrictions test p-values lie between
0.260 and 0.849, and the exogeneity test p-values lie between 0.154 and 0.492.
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The first approach uses a between-group estimator, which collapses the
panel data into a single cross-section by calculating the sample means
for the dependent variable and all the independent variables and then
estimates the functional relationship based on the calculated mean values.
The second approach considers each year of data as a separate cross-
section and estimates the functional relationship for each year separately
within a joint system of equations that constructs a separate equation
for each year. Joint estimation of the three year-specific equations
increases the efficiency of the estimates by exploiting the correlation
across the three equations’ error terms. Estimation of individual years
proves useful because it allows the study to assess whether the effect of
overall enforcement strategy is statistically significant in each year of
the sample.16
The empirical analysis considers three regressor sets that differ based
on the exclusion or inclusion of intervention-related factors. Model 1
excludes all of the intervention-related factors. Model 2 includes only
the specific adjustment factors. Model 3 includes both the specific
adjustment and the general threat factors. By excluding the intervention-
related factors, Model 1 allows the estimated effects of the overall
enforcement strategy to absorb all of the influences associated with any
differential use of inspections and enforcement actions. Moreover, the
empirical analysis considers two model sets that differ based on the
temporal structure of the data. Model Set A includes the regressors
needed to implement the between-group estimator, while Model Set B
includes the regressors needed to generate the year-specific estimates.
Table 2 reports the between-group estimates for Model Set A (Mod-
els A1, A2, and A3). Table 3 reports the year-specific estimates for
Model Set B (Models B1, B2, and B3). Regarding the control factors,
an assessment of the year-specific estimates (Model Set B) generates
16While the dependent variable — audit frequency — and most of the regres-
sors vary over the sample period (1999–2001), the measures capturing the overall
enforcement strategy do not vary over the sample period for a given facility. The
survey questions generating these measures either explicitly or implicitly instruct
the respondents to consider the preceding three-year period as a whole. Due to
this lack of variation over time, use of the between-group estimator seems the most
appropriate estimation approach since this approach considers the three-year period
as a single cross-section. Then again, the analysis may reasonably assume that the
measures of overall enforcement strategy sufficiently apply to each individual year as
well as they apply to the whole three-year period.
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Table 2: Poisson between-group estimation of audit counts: Model set A.
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3
Variable Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Primary Explanatory Variables
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
1.4814 0.008 1.5282 0.004 1.4542 0.007
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes
fair treatment)
−0.5253 0.093 −0.5430 0.076 −0.5571 0.070
Same individual regulator (vs multiple
regulators)
0.4304 0.092 0.4625 0.065 0.4416 0.079
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs request)
0.8082 0.008 0.7496 0.009 0.7450 0.009
No request for assistance from elected
official (vs request)
−0.0497 0.936 0.0627 0.912 0.0821 0.887
State is typical regulator (vs federal) 0.1649 0.764 0.0938 0.862 0.1179 0.837
Always likely to allow access (vs
likely/somewhat likely)
0.0004 0.999 −0.0121 0.979 −0.0265 0.955
Control Factors
Organic chemical manufacturing
(vs “other”)
−0.0681 0.886 −0.0871 0.855 −0.1488 0.696
Inorganic chemical manufacturing
(vs “other”)
−0.7404 0.039 −0.6626 0.056 −0.7232 0.031
Major facility classification (vs minor) 0.4963 0.104 0.5532 0.085 0.7551 0.089
Facility employees (count) −0.0002 0.415 −0.0003 0.242 −0.0004 0.145
Age of facility (years) 0.0054 0.238 0.0048 0.284 0.0046 0.328
Facility’s experience with NPDES
system (years)
−0.0260 0.098 −0.0295 0.057 −0.0262 0.085
Facility owned by publicly-held firm
(vs privately-held)
−0.4795 0.229 −0.3402 0.412 −0.3505 0.379
Preceding calendar year state
inspections (count)
0.0202 0.714 −0.0319 0.956
Preceding calendar year federal
inspections (count)
−3.5870 0.018 −3.3501 0.037
Preceding calendar year enforcement
actions (count)
0.1459 0.213 0.1389 0.189
Annual state inspections of others/no.
of other facilities
0.0781 0.764
Annual federal inspections of others/no.
of other facilities
−4.5388 0.502
Annual enforcement actions at
others/no. of other facilities
0.2127 0.991
(Continued)
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Table 2: (Continued)
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3
Variable Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
LR test of zero slopes [χ2] 437.6 0.000 523.8 0.000 546.7 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1452 0.1737 0.1813
Goodness of fit [χ2] 2034 0.000 1947 0.000 1924 0.000
LR test: equal slopes for individual
relationship measures [χ2]
10.20 0.117 11.27 0.080 10.57 0.103
Sample size 215 215 215
Notes: Each model also includes an intercept term.
p-values based on robust standard errors.
conclusions for each sample year that are identical to those supported
by an assessment of the between-group estimates (Model Set A). Thus,
for the sake of brevity, we report only the coefficients relating to the
overall enforcement strategy measures for Model Set B in Table 3.
Interpretation of Effects not related to Enforcement and Monitoring
Before interpreting the effects of the overall enforcement strategy on
audit frequency, along with the effects of intervention-related factors,
this subsection interprets the effects not related to enforcement and
monitoring. For this interpretation, we focus on the estimation results
stemming from Model Set A. Results from Model Set B generate nearly
identical conclusions.
These individual conclusions follow First, Inorganic chemical man-
ufacturing facilities audit less frequently than “other” chemical manu-
facturing facilities. This result may indicate that production processes
influence the costs or benefits of implementing audits. Specifically,
organic chemical production processes are easier to audit and/or the
information gleaned from audits is more beneficial for modifying or-
ganic chemical production processes. Second, Major facilities audit
more frequently than minor facilities. Perhaps this result indicates the
presence of economies of scale with respect to audit frequency. Third,
More experienced facilities audit less frequently. Consistent with our a
priori expectations, more experienced facilities appear to see a lesser
need to glean insight from audits, that is, experience substitutes for
audit findings.
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Table 3: Poisson joint estimation of year-specific equations for audits: Model set B.
Model B1 Model B2 Model B3
Variable Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Year 1999 [N = 215]
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
1.3653 0.025 1.3927 0.017 1.4395 0.027
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes
fair treatment)
−0.4578 0.143 −0.4489 0.148 −0.4434 0.155
Same individual regulator (vs multiple
regulators)
0.3116 0.215 0.2939 0.250 0.3052 0.246
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs request)
0.6797 0.053 0.7243 0.044 0.7392 0.041
No request for assistance from elected
official (vs request)
−0.1290 0.846 −0.1824 0.781 −0.1183 0.859
State is typical regulator (vs federal) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Always likely to allow access (vs
likely/somewhat likely)
−0.0580 0.904 −0.0179 0.971 −0.0375 0.939
LR test: equal slopes for individual
relationship measures [χ2]
11.96 0.063 12.65 0.049 11.63 0.071
Year 2000 [N = 215]
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
1.5273 0.003 1.5806 0.001 1.5602 0.003
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes
fair treatment)
−0.5571 0.096 −0.5869 0.081 −0.5949 0.079
Same individual regulator (vs multiple
regulators)
0.4598 0.082 0.4610 0.079 0.4447 0.090
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs request)
0.8088 0.010 0.7912 0.009 0.8087 0.007
No request for assistance from elected
official (vs request)
0.0171 0.979 0.0581 0.924 0.0362 0.951
State is typical regulator (vs federal) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Always likely to allow access (vs
likely/somewhat likely)
−0.0028 0.955 0.0151 0.973 0.0226 0.961
LR test: equal slopes for individual
relationship measures [χ2]
20.62 0.002 21.30 0.002 21.38 0.002
(Continued)
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Table 3: (Continued)
Model B1 Model B2 Model B3
Variable a Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Year 2001 [N = 215]
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
1.4635 0.010 1.4850 0.008 1.2388 0.008
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes
fair treatment)
−0.5616 0.083 −0.5845 0.061 −0.6646 0.029
Same individual regulator (vs multiple
regulators)
0.3799 0.176 0.4361 0.091 0.4280 0.090
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs request)
0.8552 0.003 0.6289 0.019 0.5737 0.037
No request for assistance from elected
official (vs request)
−0.0940 0.872 0.3730 0.573 0.3982 0.567
State is typical regulator (vs federal) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Always likely to allow access
(vs likely/somewhat likely)
0.0564 0.901 0.0093 0.983 −0.0550 0.903
LR test: equal slopes for individual
relationship measures [χ2]
10.01 0.124 9.64 0.141 10.39 0.104
LR test of zero slopes [χ2] 1179 0.000 1374 0.000 1497 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1346 0.1569 0.1709
Goodness of fit [χ2] 6040 0.000 5845 0.000 5722 0.000
Notes: Each model also includes an intercept term and all the regressors shown in Table 2
except the “State is Typical Regulator (versus Federal)” indicator, which lacks sufficient
variation.
p-values based on robust standard errors.
These conclusions are fully robust to the inclusion of deterrence
factors as regressors.
Interpretation of Effects related to Enforcement and Monitoring
This subsection interprets the effects of the overall enforcement strategy
on audit frequency, along with the effects of intervention-related factors.
The between-group estimation results support the following con-
clusions, which are robust to the choice of regressor set, with a single
minor exception, and robust to the time period analyzed, with a very
few exceptions: First, Greater cooperation in general leads to more
frequent audits. Second, Interaction with the same individual regulator
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leads to more frequent audits than does interaction with multiple regu-
lators. Thus, similar to cooperation in general, stability of the regulator–
regulated facility relationship increases audit frequency, consistent with
the cooperative model. Third, The failure to request assistance from
the regulator’s supervisor leads to more frequent audits than does a re-
quest for assistance. Thus, a higher quality regulator–regulated facility
relationship apparently increases audit frequency, similar to cooperation
in general, again consistent with the cooperative model. Fourth, In
contrast to the request for assistance from the regulator’s supervisor, a
request for assistance from an elected official does not influence audit
frequency, providing support for neither the cooperative model nor
the noncooperative model. As one interpretation of these two related
results, the request for assistance from a regulator’s supervisor under-
mines cooperation more so than a request to an elected official. Fifth,
Audit frequency does not appear to depend on either the type of typical
regulator — state versus federal — or a facility’s willingness to allow
a regulator access to its operations without prior notification. Thus,
neither proximity to a regulator nor the level of trust supported by the
regulator–regulated relationship influences audit frequency, providing
support for neither theoretical model.
In stark contrast to all of these conclusions, “always fair” treatment
leads to less frequent audits than does “sometimes fair” treatment,
consistent with the noncooperative model. Put differently, by treating
a facility sometimes unfairly, a regulator is apparently able to prompt
more frequent auditing. In other words, occasional unfair treatment
may increase auditing effort. This result may reveal that a regulator
who always treats a facility fairly has been “captured,” while a regulator
who treats a facility in a more balanced fashion retains its leverage with
a regulated facility. This conclusion supports the noncooperative model.
As the exceptions to these general conclusions, the year 1999-specific
estimates do not support the conclusion relating to the fairness of treat-
ment and the contrast between same regulator and multiple regulators.
As a lesser point, the year 2001-specific results do not support the
conclusion relating to the contrast between same regulator and multiple
regulators within Model B1.
In sum, consideration of all the individual measures of the regulator–
regulated facility relationship offers a rich understanding of the interplay
between regulator and regulated facility.
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Lastly, we explore the role of government interventions — inspec-
tions and enforcement. Since conclusions are robust to the choice of
regressor set (with a single minor exception), greater cooperation leads
to more frequent auditing even when the analysis controls for the use
of inspections and enforcement actions and the threat of their use.
To complement this understanding, we interpret the effects of
intervention-related factors. Based on the between-group estimation
results shown in Table 2, greater use of federal inspections apparently
prompts less frequent audits. This results is consistent with the cooper-
ative model and with the reported conclusion that greater cooperation
prompts more frequent audits. Perhaps, federal inspections are less
cooperative and this weaker cooperation undermines efforts to audit
frequently. This conclusion is robust to the choice of regressor set.17
Separate Analysis of Major Facilities and Minor Facilities
We next assess the robustness of our conclusions by splitting the sample
between major facilities (N = 88) and minor facilities (N = 127).
We estimate the two sub-samples using both Poisson between-group
estimation based on Model Set A and Poisson joint estimation of year-
specific equations based on Model Set B. Table 4ba and b reports
the former estimates; the latter estimates are available upon request.
Tables 4ba and 4bb display the results for major and minor facilities,
respectively. By splitting the sample, we expect reductions in the levels
of significance. Not surprisingly then, Tables 4ba reveals that two of
17We assess the robustness of the estimation results and conclusions by employing
three regressor sets and two estimation approaches. We also assess robustness by
exploring whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of EPA regional indicators
as regressors. All of the individual conclusions relating to the regulator-regulated
facility relationship are fully robust to the inclusion of the EPA regional indicators as
regressors based on the preferable estimation approach of between-group estimation,
regardless of the regressor set. Moreover, the year-specific results for Model Set B
support the same conclusions for the years 2000 and 2001, regardless of the regressor
set, even though the statistical significance of the coefficient associated with the
request for supervisory assistance slips to the 12–15% level. In contrast, the 1999
year-specific results only marginally support the identified conclusions, with p-values
ranging between 0.09 and 0.17 and generally acceptable significance (p ≤ 0.10)
generated for only two dimensions: (1) contrast between the same regulator and
multiple regulators and (2) request for supervisory assistance. Nevertheless, we
conclude that our conclusions are strongly robust to the inclusion of EPA regional
indicators.
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Table 4a: Poisson between-group estimation of audit counts: Model set A — split
sample between major facilities.
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3
Variable Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Primary explanatory variables
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
2.1120 0.007 2.0752 0.003 2.1571 0.001
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes
fair treatment)
−0.1834 0.663 −0.1515 0.721 −0.2618 0.544
Same individual regulator (vs multiple
regulators)
0.0297 0.930 −0.0196 0.951 −0.0910 0.771
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs request)
1.0884 0.008 1.0856 0.008 1.0970 0.009
No request for assistance from elected
official (vs request)
−0.2311 0.678 −0.3689 0.499 −0.4035 0.443
State is typical regulator (vs federal)
Always likely to allow access
(vs likely/somewhat likely)
0.9443 0.237 1.0232 0.116 0.9211 0.162
Control Factors
Organic chemical manufacturing
(vs “other”)
−0.3245 0.440 −0.2891 0.483 −0.3047 0.391
Inorganic chemical manufacturing
(vs “other”)
−1.4456 0.002 −1.1501 0.005 −1.2381 0.001
Facility employees (count) −0.0003 0.511 −0.0004 0.384 −0.0005 0.283
Age of facility (years) 0.0098 0.127 0.0074 0.198 0.0058 0.321
Facility’s experience with NPDES
system (years)
−0.0481 0.060 −0.0553 0.031 −0.0477 0.097
Facility owned by publicly held firm
(vs privately held)
−0.7769 0.114 −0.5775 0.301 −0.5644 0.296
Preceding calendar year state
inspections (count)
0.1243 0.283 0.0859 0.484
Preceding calendar year federal
inspections (count)
−3.0091 0.055 −2.8469 0.103
Preceding calendar year enforcement
actions (count)
0.0456 0.769 0.0908 0.541
Annual state inspections of others/No.
of other facilities
0.0064 0.967
Annual federal inspections of
others/No. of other facilities
−2.1038 0.697
annual enforcement actions at
others/No. of other facilities
−0.4113 0.484
Pseudo R2 0.3104 0.3648 0.3747
Goodness of fit [χ2] 1181.15 0.0001114.05 0.0001091.95 0.000
Sample size 88 88 88
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Table 4b: Poisson between-group estimation of audit counts: Model set A — split
sample between minor facilities.
Model B1 Model B2 Model B3
Variable Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Primary explanatory variables
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
0.8687 0.165 0.8991 0.107 0.9734 0.198
Always fair treatment (vs
sometimes fair treatment)
−0.5416 0.164 −0.5649 0.135 −0.5286 0.139
Same individual regulator (vs
multiple regulators)
0.6420 0.056 0.6859 0.041 0.9074 0.013
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs
request)
0.6084 0.111 0.5914 0.081 0.6022 0.111
No request for assistance from
elected official (vs request)
1.4323 0.027 1.4468 0.045 1.4930 0.012
State is typical regulator (vs
federal)
0.4254 0.499 0.3166 0.579 0.1759 0.758
Always likely to allow access (vs
likely/somewhat likely)
−0.3428 0.506 −0.4267 0.388 −0.2045 0.679
Control Factors
Organic chemical manufacturing
(vs “other”)
0.1723 0.661 0.2595 0.536 0.3037 0.432
Inorganic chemical manufacturing
(vs “other”)
−0.3194 0.442 −0.1385 0.758 −0.1557 0.730
Facility employees (count) 0.0001 0.941 0.0008 0.131 0.0008 0.141
Age of facility (years) 0.0043 0.497 0.0038 0.539 0.0057 0.363
Facility’s experience with NPDES
system (years)
−0.0081 0.612 −0.0080 0.632 −0.0103 0.541
Facility owned by publicly held
firm (vs privately held)
−0.2785 0.423 −0.3781 0.300 −0.3525 0.322
Preceding calendar year state
inspections (count)
−0.2036 0.170 −0.3469 0.067
Preceding calendar year federal
inspections (count)
−6.1139 0.001 −5.3528 0.028
Preceding calendar year
enforcement actions (count)
−6.8430 0.052 −7.2186 0.051
Annual state inspections of
others/No. of other facilities
0.4370 0.138
Annual federal inspections of
others/No. of other facilities
−34.0741 0.079
Annual enforcement actions at
others/No. of other facilities
9.9151 0.404
Pseudo R2 0.1067 0.1273 0.1623
Goodness of fit [χ2] 1512.33 0.000 1465.26 0.000 1315.62 0.000
Sample size 127 127 127
Notes: Each model also includes an intercept term.
p-values based on robust standard errors.
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the four effects of the regulator–regulated relationship found significant
based on estimation of the full sample lose their statistical significance
(p > 0.10) based on the smaller subsample of major facilities. The
effects of “generally cooperative” and “no request for assistance from
the regulator’s supervisor” remain statistically significant. Despite any
loss of significance, the four relevant coefficient signs remain the same
as when based on the full sample.
Similarly, Table 4bb reveals that one or two (depending on the
model) of the four regulator–regulated relationship effects found signif-
icant based on the full sample lose their statistical significance based
on the smaller sub-sample of minor facilities. The effects of “same
individual regulator” and “no request for assistance from the regulator’s
supervisor” remain statistically significant in all three models. The
effect of “generally cooperative” retains its statistical significance in
Model A2. (The effect of “always fair treatment” is almost marginally
significant given a p-value of 0.13 in Models A2 and A3.) Again, the four
relevant coefficient signs remain the same. Interestingly, the effect of
“no request for assistance from an elected official” becomes significantly
positive. Clearly this effect differs between minor and major facilities.
(The relevant test statistic is significant given p-values ranging between
0.02 and 0.05.)
Excepting the effect of requesting assistance from an elected official,
we find that, in general, our conclusions are moderately robust with
respect to the type of facility. Nevertheless, we admit that our analysis
of major facilities does not generate results that support the same
conclusions supported by the results generated from analysis of the full
sample.
Interactions between Overall Enforcement Approach and
Government Interventions
As our final assessment of robustness, we generate interactions between
each of the seven overall enforcement approach dimensions and each of
government intervention measures and then include these interactions as
additional regressors in our estimation. Given our study’s objective, we
again focus on government interventions taken against specific facilities.
Moreover, our estimation results reveal that government interventions
taken against other similar facilities do not prove statistically significant.
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(Joint tests of significance for the three general threat factors based on
Model A3 and Model B3 estimates generate statistics of 7.04 and 7.10,
respectively, with p-values of 0.633 and 0.778, respectively.) Thus, we
focus on Models A2 and B2.
This assessment of robustness relies on interpreting 21 interactions
in the between-group estimation and 63 interactions in the year-specific
estimation. Given the large number of interactions, we interpret the
results cautiously and pay more attention to the between-group esti-
mates.
Rather than tabulating the many relevant individual coefficient es-
timates (31 between-group coefficient and 93 year-specific coefficients),
we organize our results into meaningful categories. Table 5a displays the
relevant calculations. First, we assess whether the three interactions asso-
ciated with each overall enforcement dimension prove jointly significant.
If not, we should focus on the initial sets of results displayed in Tables 2
and 3. As shown in Table 5a, based on the between-group estimates, the
set of interactions prove significant for five of the seven dimensions. The
interactions relating to trust (likelihood to allow the regulator access
to facility operations without any prior announcement) are not jointly
significant. And the data do not provide enough variation to assess
the interactions relating to the distinction between state and federal
Table 5a: Marginal effects from poisson between-group estimation of audit counts
involving interactions between regulator–regulated dimensions and government in-
terventions as an extension of Model A2: Joint test of statistical significance for
interactions by regulator–regulated dimension.
Regulator–regulated dimension Statistic p-value
Generally cooperative (vs generally coercive) 4.23 0.040
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes fair treatment) 6.20 0.102
Same individual regulator (vs multiple regulators) 11.45 0.009
No request for assistance from regulator’s supervisor (vs request) 19.21 0.000
No request for assistance from elected official (vs request) 10.58 0.014
State is typical regulator (vs federal)a n/a n/a
Always likely to allow access (vs likely/somewhat likely) 2.65 0.266
Note: aThis factor’s interactions involving specific deterrence measures lack sufficient vari-
ation.
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regulators. The year-specific results support these same conclusions
except in 5 of the 21 cases: general approach (Year 2000), same regulator
versus multiple regulators (Year 2000), request for supervisory assis-
tance (Year 1999), request for elected official’s assistance (Year 2000),
and announced regulatory access to facility operations (Year 1999).
Second, we assess the marginal effects associated with each individual
overall enforcement approach dimension. We consider both the sign of
the marginal effect and its statistical significance. Given the presence of
statistically significant interactions, each marginal effect represents the
sum of the main coefficient for each dimension and the three interaction
coefficients, each multiplied by some particular value of the relevant
government intervention factor.18
Tables 5b and 5c tabulate the marginal effects calculated under
certain monitoring and enforcement conditions, that is, specified values
for state inspections, federal inspections, and enforcement actions. By
construction, the main coefficients reflect marginal effects when all of
the government intervention measures are set to zero, which represent
the sample minima for these factors. The left panel of Table 5b displays
these marginal effects. As a contrast, we calculate a second set of
marginal effects by setting the government intervention factors to their
sample maxima — 3 state inspections, 1 federal inspection, and 10.3
enforcement actions — for the between-group estimation. The right
panel of Table 5b displays the resulting marginal effects. Lastly, we
select the specific values for the government intervention factors carefully
in order to generate for each individual overall enforcement approach
dimension: (1) the most positive marginal effect, which represents the
“best case for greater cooperation,” and (2) the most negative marginal
effect, which represents the “best case for weaker cooperation.” Table 5c
displays the most positive and most negative marginal effects in the left
and right panels, respectively.
18For example, the marginal effect for the general relationship of cooperation
versus coercion, denoted asM , equals the main coefficient for the general relationship,
denoted as G, plus the interaction coefficient involving state inspections, denoted as
IS, multiplied by the count of state inspections, denoted as CS, plus the interaction
coefficient involving federal inspections, denoted as IF, multiplied by the count
of federal inspections, denoted as CF, plus the interaction coefficient involving
enforcement actions, denoted as E, multiplied by the count of enforcement actions,
denoted as CE: M = G + (IS × CS) + (IF × CF) + (E × CE).
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Table 5b: Marginal effects from poisson between-group estimation of audit counts
involving interactions between regulator–regulated dimensions and government in-
terventions as an extension of Model A2: Marginal effects — each government
intervention measure set to sample minimum or maximum.
Sample minima Sample maxima
Regulator–regulated dimension Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
2.3818 0.009 −21.3002 0.048
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes fair
treatment)
−0.8582 0.041 42.2764 0.014
Same individual regulator (vs multiple
regulators)
0.7041 0.027 −39.1516 0.007
No request for assistance from regulator’s
supervisor (vs request)
0.7093 0.017 −37.7211 0.021
No request for assistance from elected
official (vs request)
1.8934 0.001 −50.9523 0.002
State is typical regulator (vs federal)a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Always likely to allow access (vs
likely/somewhat likely)
−0.2616 0.670 8.7810 0.178
Note: aThis factor’s interactions involving specific deterrence measures lack sufficient vari-
ation.
An assessment of the first two sets of marginal effects reveals the
following conclusions. As with the initial set of estimation results,
when regulatory monitoring and enforcement is sufficiently low, most of
the individual overall enforcement approach dimensions demonstrate
that greater cooperation leads to more frequent audits yet “always fair
treatment” leads to less frequent audits than does “sometimes unfair
treatment.” In contrast to the initial results, the absence of a request for
an elected official’s assistance leads to more frequent audits than does the
presence of such a request. However, when regulatory monitoring and
enforcement are sufficiently high, each conclusion flips. The significantly
positive effects become significantly negative, while the one significantly
negative effect becomes significantly positive. Thus, the marginal effects
for five of the seven dimensions range between negative and positive
depending on regulatory conditions.
An assessment of the best cases for greater cooperation and weaker
cooperation support the same conclusions, as shown in Table 5c. Each
of the same marginal effects ranges between negative and positive.
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Table 5c: Marginal effects from poisson between-group estimation of audit counts
involving interactions between regulator–regulated dimensions and government in-
terventions as an extension of Model A2: Marginal effects — interventions set to
support “best case” for greater/weaker cooperation.
Regulator–regulated Best Case for Cooperation Best Case for Coercion
dimension Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value
Generally cooperative (vs generally
coercive)
2.3818 0.009 −21.3002 0.048
Always fair treatment (vs sometimes
fair treatment)
43.5070 0.016 −2.0888 0.510
Same individual regulator (vs
multiple regulators)
5.4870 0.007 −43.9345 0.003
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs request)
0.7093 0.017 −37.7211 0.021
No request for assistance from
elected official (vs request)
2.2254 0.006 −51.2842 0.002
State is typical regulator (vs
federal)a
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Always likely to allow access (vs
likely/ somewhat likely)
8.7810 0.178 −0.2616 0.670
Note: aThis factor’s interactions involving specific deterrence measures lack sufficient vari-
ation.
An assessment of the year-specific estimation results support identical
conclusions in general. At one extreme, marginal effects prove sig-
nificantly positive except as noted: same regulator versus multiple
regulators (Year 2000) and unannounced access to facility operations
(Year 1999), representing only 2 of 21 cases. At the other extreme,
marginal effects prove significantly negative except as noted: generally
cooperative versus generally coercive (Years 1999 and 2000), fair treat-
ment (Years 1999 and 2001), same regulator versus multiple regulators
(Years 2000 and 2001), and absence/presence of a request for an elected
official’s assistance (Years 2000 and 2001), representing only 7 of 21
cases.
In closing, we cautiously interpret the marginal effects generated by
consideration of interactions between overall enforcement approach and
government interventions because the dimensionality of 21 interactions
in the between-group estimation and 63 interactions in the year-specific
estimation is sizable. As important, marginal effects derived from sample
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maxima for government interventions obviously rely on extremes. While
the presence of significant interactions clearly reveals that marginal
effects depend on regulatory conditions, the presence of significantly
negative marginal effects in the case of most dimensions and a signifi-
cantly positive marginal effect for the fairness of regulatory treatment
may not represent accurately the analytical results.
Policy and Research Implications
The conclusions generated by the empirical results possess clear policy
and research implications First, Conclusions supported by the primary
estimates imply that environmental regulators seeking to induce more
frequent auditing should in general employ a more cooperative approach.
However, these conclusions also imply that environmental regulators
should not be overly fair; otherwise the regulators may lose their lever-
age with regulated facilities. Yet an assessment of interactions involving
government intervention factors reveals that marginal effects appear to
depend on regulatory monitoring and enforcement conditions. Based
on extreme conditions, the marginal effects may differ in sign. Thus,
the final policy implications may depend on regulatory monitoring and
enforcement conditions. Second, These conclusions imply that future
research on effects of the overall enforcement strategy employed by an
environmental regulator should not view this strategy as unidimensional.
Instead, future research should view the enforcement strategy as repre-
senting a relationship between a regulator and a regulated facility and
attempt to measure multiple dimensions of this relationship because
altering individual aspects of this relationship may have greater or lesser
impacts on the behavior of regulated facilities.
Appendix: Incomplete Response to Survey of Chemical
Manufacturing Facilities
This appendix assesses the incomplete response to our original survey
of chemical manufacturing facilities. Given the survey’s non-response
rate of 73%, the potential for sample selection bias is a valid concern.
As the initial assessment of this concern, we compare the original
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sample of 1003 potentially eligible facilities to the 267 facilities that
actually completed the survey. Based on this comparison, we find no
systematic state or regional bias in survey participation. For example,
only the Midwest region is slightly over-represented in the response
group, and only the Northeast region is slightly under-represented.
These differences, however, are small. In addition, across most of the
states, the difference between representation in the original sample and
representation in the response group averages less than 2%. In contrast,
our initial assessment reveals some difference in the participation of
major facilities versus minor facilities. In the original sample, 69% of
facilities are minor facilities and 31% are major facilities. In the group
of survey respondents, major facilities are slightly over-represented at
39%. This difference proves statistically significant.
As a stronger assessment, we test for sample selection bias using
the first stage of the Heckman two-stage sample selection procedure
(Heckman, 1979). Specifically, we assess whether any relevant factors
appear to affect a facility’s decision to complete our survey once it is
contacted. This assessment reveals a bias in a single dimension: major
facilities were more likely to respond to the survey than were minor
facilities. Put differently, the Heckman analysis indicates that only the
distinction between minor and major facilities proves important for
explaining whether or not a contacted facility completed the admin-
istered survey. The Heckman analysis demonstrates that neither the
preceding history of inspections nor the preceding enforcement actions
against a particular facility explains whether or not a contacted facility
responded to the survey. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that
the decision to respond is not explained by the EPA region in which
a particular facility resides. Thus, even if the threat of inspections and
enforcement actions varies across EPA regions, this variation does not
explain whether or not a contacted facility responds to the survey. (The
analysis is not able to control for variation across states in a similar
fashion given the large number of individual states, relative to the
sample size.)
From the first stage of the Heckman procedure, we do not generate
an inverse Mills ratio and then incorporate the inverse Mills ratio as an
explanatory factor in the estimation of audit frequency. Implementation
of the Heckman two-step sample selection procedure permits only the
use of ordinary least squares (OLS) in the second stage. Of course, use of
152 Earnhart and Glicksman
OLS to estimate count data generates inconsistent, biased, and inefficient
estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Therefore, we implement only
the first stage of the Heckman procedure.
As one last form of sample selection assessment, we incorporate
information on discharges and effluent limits, for which data are pub-
licly available only for major facilities, for both survey respondents
and nonrespondents. Consistent with our final sample of analysis, our
last form of assessment focuses exclusively on major facilities. Using
two-sample means T -tests, we demonstrate that the sample of survey
respondents and the sample of survey nonrespondent facilities gener-
ated extremely similar discharge-to-limit ratios (i.e., actual discharges
divided by permitted limits) for the time period covered by the sur-
vey instrument: January 1999–March 2003. This analysis considers
separately the two most prominent wastewater pollutants: total sus-
pended solids (TSS) and biological oxygen demand (BOD). For the TSS
discharge-to-limit ratio, both of the sample means equal 0.267 and the
t-test, p-value is 0.969. For the BOD discharge-to-limit ratio, the two
sample means are nearly identical −0.261 and 0.256 — and the t-test,
p-value is 0.616.
For all these reasons, the study does not correct for any potential
sample selection bias. This lack of correction is consistent with recent
prominently published studies of environmental management practices
(Anton et al., 2004; Arimura et al., 2008).
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